Monday, May 24, 2010

LOVE

LOVE: A NECESSARY FACTOR FOR PEACE

ETINOSA-OKANKAN CHRISTOPHER OSAMUYI

Can we define love? Do we know what the word love really means? Who can fully admit to have comprehended what the concept of love is all about?

Love they say is our greatest strength, stronger than anything one can ever think of, Sweeter than the sweetest thing man can ever claim to be very sweet. Precious than the most precious of stones, lighter than the air we breathe, but still heavier than the entire world itself. Oh what a great thing man should desire!

But in it fullness, do we really know what love means? Do we really grasp its essence? This I do not think we do, though some may say; we know what love is, but I still do not understand how best we could desire, have, pursue, or even treat this four letter word: Love.

Love is sweet, yet very bitter, light, yet still too heavy. Love can be precious, but same time unpleasant. Love prospers, but some times it fades so easily. Love can be easy to get, but still it can be difficult to have. Oh what a mysterious thing it is!

When we say mysterious, what do we mean? Do we by this mean that the concept; love, is vague? How do we see love as being vague? Or how do we project this vagueness of love? Is love really vague? Does it carry just one meaning or different meanings? What is it? Does it serve different purposes or one purpose? Oh what will I say about this thing called love!

Love for some carries only one meaning, while for some, it carries so many and for others, it does not exist. But wait a minute; does love really exist? Or is love just a word without meaning? It sometimes amazing, when they talk of its importance, its legend, stories and poems. But even in this wondering, which of these meanings, will I say love is best for? From an angle, it seems so correct, from another, it seems so perfect, but still from some certain angle, it seems not to exist at all. Oh this word love, what are you!

Love stands to be a moral word, but also stand as an immoral word. Which is it? What would I say makes it moral or immoral? Is it our perception of it that makes it moral or immoral? Can it be put as being both, that is, moral and immoral? But this will not stand, for it will be a total contradiction. Oh where will I place this word love? How can I talk of it? Ah it seems so confusing!

Love most times, stands to be a religious concept; some times it assumes the status of a social concept. As a religious concept, it cuts across all religion and in this light, it is referred to as the fraternal bond amongst members of these religions in their right. Oh if this is the case, it means that love, brings about unity!

In Christianity, which is the major perspective from which I see this word; love, we see it as a virtue, which is fundamental and we consider it the number one. For all the scripture of the Christendom, put together, reflects one common message; the love for God and for fellow men and women.

In Christianity, love entails emptying oneself for the sake of another. Not having, in other for others to possess, willing, when there seems to be no willingness, giving, when there is nothing to give, consoling others, even when one is in sorrow. Helping out even when one is in greater trouble. Showing mercy to others, even when one has not been pardoned by them. Creating time for others when there is even none for you. Having bonafide interest on others, even while neglecting you – (Mother Theresa of Calcutta). To it apex, it involves one ready to give his life for the sake of others (Jesus Christ). Doing to others, what one will want others do to oneself.

In this sense of Christianity, love seems to be none benefiting. Oh love, can you be so cruel, to let one enjoy and the other suffer! Is it that there is no room for equality? Or that your equality springs from your inequality? Which is it?

Christianity would explain love as something that man cannot do without. Hence, it teaches that it was out of love for man that man was created by God in the first place, and it is out of that same love that God redeemed man – “for God so love the world, he gave his only beloved son to die for it” (Jn. 3 : 16). Christianity teaches that man must love this God in return, this God who has given all that is dearest to him, in order that man might be saved. But Christianity does not just stop at the love of God, it also teaches that man must learn to love his fellow man, ready to share something with another out of nothing, in this it teaches that all will be equal in the sight of man’s maker (God), and through this love for one another, it says that Peace and Joy will reign among men. Hence there will be that necessary equality.

In conclusion the message from the foregoing is obvious and it is the fact that, without love for our fellow man, that necessary peace, which we tend to pray for, seizes. We must appreciate, what God has created, and then love it as we would also love him who has given us life. For there is no way one can argue to love a person, while despising what the person has created. You can not say you love God, but hate your fellow man. For us to attain the necessary peace we are looking for within and outside of us, we must first desire to love God, and our fellow men; ready to give, to listen and to cooperate with the grace of God and to be able to live together with our fellow men, in an atmosphere, of understanding, which certainly will generate and radiate that necessary Peace, Unity and Joy.

Friday, May 21, 2010

African Logic

INTRODUCTION

In answering the question of the existence of African logic, one will readily expect one of these two questions, namely; whether it is or not. Logic itself, being a primary instantiation or extraction of philosophy will pre-empt that the answer be philosophical perhaps, with reasons for the claim. A lot already has been said about the non-existence of African logic.

As response to these claims, this presentation shall take into cognizance, various ideas and practices, so as to tell us whether or not there is an African logic. However, in achieving this, the expectations of this paper are as follows:

1. Conceptualization of concepts

2. Western conception of logic

· Aristotle and logic

· Aristotle and the world of reasoning

3. Argument of no African logic

· Levy Bruhl, Durkheim & Senghor

· Other philosophers.

4. Responses to the arguments

· Peter Winch’s claim

· Other responses

· The unique way of thinking in Africa.

5. Evaluation and Conclusion.

WHAT IS LOGIC

The term logic comes from the Greek word logos. The variety of senses that logos possesses may suggest the difficulties to be encountered in characterizing the nature and scope of logic. Among the partial translations of logos, there are “sentence,” “discourse,” “reason,” “rule,” “ratio,” “account” (especially the account of the meaning of an expression), “rational principle,” and “definition.” Not unlike this proliferation of meanings, the subject matter of logic has been said to be the “laws of thought” “the rules of right reasoning,” “the principles of valid argumentation,” “the use of certain words labeled ‘logical constants',” “truths (true propositions) based solely on the meanings of the terms they contain,” and so on.

It is relatively easy to discern some order in the above array of explanations. Some of the characterizations are in fact closely related to each other. When logic is said, for instance, to be the study of the laws of thought, these laws cannot be the empirical (or observable) regularities of actual human thinking as studied in psychology; they must be laws of correct reasoning, which are independent of the psychological idiosyncrasies of the thinker. Moreover, there is a parallelism between correct thinking and valid argumentation: valid argumentation may be thought of as an expression of correct thinking, and the latter as an internalization of the former. In the sense of this parallelism, laws of correct thought will match those of correct argumentation. With this in hand, we can now proceed to see what African logic is like.

AFRICAN LOGIC

The term African logic and logic in Africa are two terms, though inter-related, posses an icon of contradiction laying the two side by side in the realm of thorough philosophical interrogation. While ‘logic in Africa’ designates any logical activity done within the margins of the geographic Africa; that is, logic seen in the light of a universal practice, which has specific paradigm or laws that makes a wholistic practice, which does not differ from place to place, culture to culture, etc. African logic on the other hand, is a specific kind of logic, which has its focus on the nature of African reality; that is, it includes the humanistic tendencies and approach that deals with the African thinking and reasoning.

Nonetheless, for any discipline to be called African logic, it must meet the criteria of origin, domicile, and interest. By origin, we mean that it evolves with the people as they grow up and become part and parcel of them. By domicile, we mean that this is only inherent and peculiar to the African soil (that is, it is always found in Africa). By interest, we mean that it focuses its tentacles of concentration, interrogation and meditation on the logical peculiarities of the geographic Africa and the peoples of Africa. It is only when these three criteria are crystallized and melted into one pot of unism that the discipline can rightly be called African logic.

With these preliminary remarks, it is hoped that the concept of African logic is clear and to some extent will guide us through without unnecessarily creating any cobweb in our mental skies

WESTERN CONCEPTION OF LOGIC

No doubt that this paper is treating African logic, but for proper achievement of purpose, it will be pertinent to grasp a clue of what the westerners term logic to be, since western logic is conceived to be the most prominent form of logic that has proved itself and still used as a measure of logical formality within the western part of the world and even to other parts of the world. This logic in question is no other than the famous Aristotelian logic.

ARISTOTLE AND LOGIC

No history of Aristotle is important to us here other than, that he was from Greece and lived 384BC to 322 BC and that he formulated the so much proclaimed logic which stands head-high in western philosophy. The summary of Aristotelian formal logic is brought to bear by his three fundamental laws, namely; the law of Identity, the law of Contradiction and the law of Excluded Middle.

The first law states that a thing is always equal to or identical with itself. The second law states that a thing cannot be unequal or different from itself. On the other hand, the third law continues the former two laws; it states that if a thing is equal to itself, it cannot be unequal or different from itself. That is, if ‘A’ equals ‘A’, it cannot equal ‘non A’. To simplify these three laws we can say what they represent simply means is that, what is, simply is and must be as it is.

Stemming from the above, we see that our conceptual experiences impel us to accept the law of identity as a father of theories. But common sense experience teaches us that continuity exist in nature and human beings have choice, than to conform to this natural inclination. Thus the significance of the formalization of the reasoning process is clear from what is said below;

The law of identity directs us to recognise likeness amidst diversity, permanence amidst changes, to single out the basic peculiarities between and apparently different instances and entities, to uncover the real bonds of unity between them; to trace the connections between different and consecutive phases of the same phenomena. That is why the discovery and the application of this law was so epoch-making in the history of scientific thought and why Aristotle, is honored continuously for grasping its extraordinary significance. And this also why the western philosophers believe that mankind must continue to think and act in accordance with this law of formal logic. (Novack, 1971:21).

Thus it becomes apparently visible that the overwhelming influence of a formalized reasoning has colonized reasoning that the experience that suppose to go along with reason has been put to fix. Furthermore, scholars have the inclination in insisting that a rational or intelligent action is that which conforms to Aristotle’s rule of formal logic. This forms the fulcrum of western rationality, perhaps western logic.

DEBATE ON THE EXISTENCE OF AFRICAN LOGIC

ARGUMENT OF NO AFRICAN LOGIC

Many scholars especially Europeans have argued that there is no African logic. It is noteworthy that this assertion is not only by philosophers but scholars of other discipline. If we concern ourselves with the works of classical anthropologists dating back to the intellectual school led by Tylor, we discover Levy Bruhl and Durkheim; these two prominent sociologists measure the rationality of any thought system according to its conformity with the laws of Aristotelian logic. This position is more particular to Levy Bruhl. In order to achieve this, he classifies the human society into two categories namely; those with primitive mentality and those with a civilized mentality. To explain this division, he says that, those who have primitive mentality are pre-logical; pre-logical in the sense that they are unscientifically oriented. While on the other hand, those who have civilized mentality, are logical, since they reason within the laws of Aristotelian formal logic. In other words, they are scientifically oriented. According to Levy Bruhl, Africans fall within the terrain of those with primitive mentality. Hence he sympathizes with Africa for failing to fall into the class of those with civilized mentality.

In his book, ‘La Mentalite Primitive’ he denies equating pre-logical with alogical or anti-logical rather he says:

Pre-logical does not mean illogical or anti-logical. Pre-logical applied to primitive mentality, means simply that it does not go out of its way as we do to avoid contradiction but it does not present the same logical requirements.

However, he does not deny the existence of logic in that society and does not seem to insist too firmly on the qualitative peculiarities of mode of thought. The logic he finds in this system is still too rudimentary and infantile to speak of. Nonetheless this view point of his is also from the fact that he studied traditional thought as a formal logician. This is why he finds it contradictory when an African says “crocodiles are spirit”. According to him such laws are intelligible when they only form part of a mystical participation.

SENGHOR

Just like his contemporary, Senghor attributes some form of reasoning to Africa, but this reasoning, cannot differentiate between the organic and the inorganic, between the subject and the object or between the law and himself. So what Levy Bruhl calls ‘logic of sentiments’, Senghor calls ‘intuitive reasoning’. Consciously or unconsciously, Senghor appeals or affirms Levy Bruhl’s conclusion that African logic is still infantile or rudimentary to be spoken of.

Analogous to the above, another argument that comes up is whether the discipline of African logic possesses any form of rationality despite the fact that logic is itself rational. Senghor revolves around the question whether what is labeled African logic is fit to be said to be logical/rational or not. Accordingly, this thinking holds on the principle of Aristotelian formal logic earlier on explained with the westerners, seeing it as the only way through which all human experiences across culture should be exposed and assessed.

RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT

To every action, there must be a reaction which is equal or even greater than the antecedents. Just as many have said that there is no African logic, we can also confidently say there is African logic, first by debunking its contrary claims and making an exploration into the thought system of the African.

At this stage of this paper we refuse to agree with Levy Bruhl’s argument, that there is no such thing as logic or rationality, among Africans. To effectively argue this, we will employ the thesis of Peter Winch on the issue of “forms of life”, which has helped to show that of all that has been used to counter argue the existence of an African logic, are all by their nature, ontologically western. According to Winch, any attempt to assess the rationality of traditional mode of thought (logic) with the logic of science, should be ignored. For him, science operates with its own concept of reality that is determined by a set of paradigms. In a different form of life, such a language of discourse is not applicable. According to Winch, there are different forms of life, and each has its own criteria for assessing what is logically intelligible and what is not. Peter Winch defines a form of life as a set of linguistic rules and practices with specific procedures for judging the validity or otherwise of given claims. In relation to traditional thoughts, Winch thinks that claims involving magic and witchcraft cannot be assessed in terms of either scientific conception or scientific standards of rationality. All such magico-religious beliefs have their own language of discourse and they can therefore be only assessed as intelligible or unintelligible when analyzed within the context of occurrence, that is within the context they are held.

Following from the above claims of Peter Winch, we can effectively argue that as far as logic or rationality is concerned, it is culture or context dependent. This will mean that for us to confirm or affirm that a given claim is logical or illogical; we must first note the context of which we assess it. Therefore, for one to say that there is no such thing as African logic, means to say that there is no culture in Africa and also goes further to affirm that the continent of Africa, lacks a form of life. For it is only in this way that one can comfortably disagree to the existence of an African logic. But this is not the case since in Africa; there are certain beliefs that are held, and for a people to hold a belief, is also for that people to have a culture. And this will also follow that for there to be a culture there equally will be a form of life.

Furthermore, if we try to claim that that which we portray as Africa today, never existed prior to colonialism and as such there should be no claim of a culture, a form of life and by extension an African logic. This in itself can also be argued in the light of the fact that the only reason why Africa was made as it is now in the colonial era was because the people of present of Africa had some characteristic feature which they share in common of such characteristics include the fact that they reason in like sense and this in fact will imply that there is a thought pattern in Africa, which in turn is logic.

Africans as we are have particular ways in which we think, and there are certain criteria, that an African looks at, to judge a given claim to be valid or invalid. Validity here will mean that for anything to be considered as valid or correct within the African cosmology, it must meet certain criteria. For instance, the belief of witchcraft in Africa can only be said or agreed to be valid, if and only if what is acclaimed to witchcraft in Africa, truly meets the necessary criteria of what is laid down by Africans as witchcraft. This will mean that since in Africa, there is the belief that there is life force in whatever exist, be it living or non-living. Though this may run contrary to what the westerners will believe based on the Aristotelian formal logic that they uphold, which by its nature, is purely a scientific logic, which can only hold sway in the physical terrain. Therefore if this is the case, we can now reaffirm that as far as logic is concerned, it is context and culture dependent for even if we claim it to be an objective concept since we all are humans and humans are rational therefore it can also still be that all humans reason in the same way. But this as it is, cannot be affirmed since humans by our nature are different from one another and this will mean that though we are all rational, we still have different pattern of thinking so that what one may see as intelligible, can also be seen as irrational and unintelligible by another. Therefore if this is agreed upon then, we the members of this group, stand to affirm that as far as African philosophy is concern, there is an African logic.

CONCLUSION

Though this paper may not have fully exhausted this topic of the existence of African logic, it will also be of use to all since in the cause of this work, we have tried to show the different stand bringing to the fore that there is a debate concerning the existence of an African logic. This paper also have allowed us to show that whatever position one may take, it will all bore down to the fact that there is still an African logic. For as the paper clearly states; thinking, rationality or logic if you like, is culture or context dependent.

Furthermore, this paper has also shown to show that although we tend to agree that there is a standard for what is logical and that all that will claim to be logical must meet this given standard, still will not be an accepted standard, if this criteria, is given from a different ontological setting. Therefore, we the members of this group have agreed that for anything to be seen as logical or for any claim to be regarded as valid or invalid, it must conform to the ontological reality of the context or culture from which it is assessed. So, we have agreed to see the sense of logic from this angle, even if there may be other perspective from which others might see it, for this is a philosophical discourse, which can be criticized at any point in time. For us, there is an African logic, or if you like, logic that is ontologically African. But we would not stop at this juncture, without living a question, for the question is more important in a philosophical discourse than the answer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

· Uduigwomen Andrew F. (Ed), footmarks on African philosophy; Lagos: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Ltd, 2002

· Oladipo O.; The idea of African philosophy, Ibadan; Notecula Publishers, 1992

· Bodunrin P.O, (Ed); philosophy in Africa: Trends and Perspective; Ife, University of Ife Press, 1985

· Wiredu K.; Philosophy and An African Culture, London; Cambridge University Press, 1980.

· Wright Richard (Ed),; African Philosophy: An Introduction.; New York; University of America, 1984

· John S. Mbiti; African Religion and Philosophy.; London; Heineman 1969.

· Bertrand Rusell; History of Western Philosophy,; London; George Allen and Union Publishers, 1946

· Omorogbe J.I ; Knowing Philosophy,; Lagos; Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd., 1990

· Houtonji Paulin S. ; African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, London; Hutchinson and Co. Publishers, 1983.

Jean-Paul Satre's Notion of The Human Person

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the question of the beingness of man, have prevailed, so that it becomes the interrogatives of all interrogatives. Who is man? This question as it present itself, may look like a rhetoric one, or one which is straight forward. But ontologically, one can understand that it is a philosophical question. Therefore, for one to answer the question effectively, it is pertinent that one be aware of the branch of philosophy that deals with this question; who is man, and how philosophers have dealt with it in time past, through the epochs of philosophy.

Anthropology is the discipline which deals with the study of man. In this study, anthropology, does not try to evaluate or pass judgment on the nature or activities of man. But this evaluation, as it is, is done by philosophy, so that in trying to answer the question of man, only philosophy after a critical, rigorous and analytic process can provide us, with something convincing. Hence, the branch of philosophy that deals with the issue of man, or study the human person, in order to understand the ultimate nature of human being is known as philosophical anthropology.[1]

Just as the history of other branches of philosophy are coterminous with the history of philosophy, the history of philosophical anthropology, is also coterminous with it. This is because, in every epoch of philosophy, the issue of the nature of man has prevailed. Though in the early periods of philosophy, philosophers (pre-Socratics) termed to focus on the cosmos: the nature of the universe. Which obviously imply that the first wonder among the Greek thinkers was the world, the cosmos, the phenomena of change and not the humans themselves.[2] But this notwithstanding, the issue of man, has been discussed in all the epochs of philosophy. In the ancient era, with philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus as the major proponent of philosophical anthropology during this era, the issue of the nature of man, was based on the idea of Body and Soul relationship, thereby, seeing man as a composite of body and soul. Also, in the medieval era, which comprises of philosophers such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Averroes, Avecina, among others, the idea of the nature of man, was one in relation to God. In the modern era, the cosmocentric attitude of the Greeks, and the theocentric attitude of the scholastics and patristic of the medieval epoch, was abandoned and they set out in the anthropocentric direction. That is, here, man constitutes the point of departure of which philosophical research move around. This period, is characterized by epistemological questions; how man knows, what does man know?[3]

Furthermore, in the contemporary period, the question of the meaning of human existence, became central. Such that at this point, man is no longer considered in the light of a mere thinking being, subject or machine if you like, but he is an existential being. This period, gave birth to the school of thought known as existentialism. So that what a philosopher is, influences his approach to the analysis of man. For instance, the anguish man was by Soren Kierkegaard, erotic man – Sigmund Freud and man as a free being – Jean-Paul Satre.

Notwithstanding the fact that there is another epoch, which is referred to as the post modernist period, we shall concern ourselves to the epochs already given above, since basically this term paper, is with regards to a particular philosopher of the contemporary period. That is, we shall at this point, shift to the main purpose of this paper, which is Jean-Paul Satre and man. Meaning therefore, that as we have seen from the above, man as a free being, we shall explore the works of Jean-Paul Satre to see, how he arrived at the idea or notion of man as a free being. Now the question is; who is Jean-Paul Satre?

JEAN-PAUL SATRE: The existentialist

Jean-Paul Satre is a French philosopher, who is regarded as the pope of existentialism. He was born June 21, 1905 in Paris, France and died April 15, 1980, Paris. He is regarded as the pope of existentialism because, existentialism, came to its highest point in the philosophy of Satre. In it, we see existentialism in its most developed and complete form. Besides, it was Satre, who made existentialism popular and he succeeded so well in popularizing it that the term existentialism became synonymous with the philosophy of Satre. Satre saw existentialism as a humanism, hence in one of his essays, work or paper if you like, he titled it; Existentialism is a humanism[4].

Existentialism is a Humanism (L'existentialisme est un humanisme) is a 1946 philosophical work by Jean-Paul Sartre. It is seen by many as one of the defining texts in the Existentialist movement.[5]

In his text, Sartre says that the key defining point of Existentialism is that the existence of a person comes before his or her essence. In simple terms, this means that, although that person exists, there is nothing to dictate that person's character, goals in life, and so on. Only the person himself can define his essence: Man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterwards.[6]

Thus, Sartre rejects what he calls "deterministic excuses" and claims that all people must take responsibility for their behaviour. Sartre defines angst and despair as the emotions people feel once they come to realize that they are responsible for all of their actions. He also describes forlornness as loneliness atheists feel when they realize that they are all alone, that there is no God to watch over them. This is associated with despair and angst.[7]

The essay has been criticized by some for giving only a superficial overview of the themes of existentialism. The essay also asserts that if a man seeks freedom for himself from false, external authorities, he at the same time must invariably will this freedom unto others (hence, existentialism offers a kind of humanism).[8]

From this above, we can observe, that Satre, was influenced by philosophers like Heidegger, Husserl, Hegel, Plato, Jaspers, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, among other existentialist, before him (Satre). Satre also had influence on so many philosophers, after him, De Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, R. D. Laing, Iris Murdoch, André Gorz, Alain Badiou, Fredric Jameson, Michael Jackson, Albert Camus, Kenzaburo Oe, Doris Lessing, William Burroughs, and Roberto Mangabeira Unger.[9]

Besides the work of Satre shown above, there are others, which we shall treat, that shed more light on the nature of the human person/human being so as to enable us grasp his position on the nature of man or of what being man is. That is, to understand how he answers the question that we have posed earlier on; who is man?

MAN: Complex of all Complex Beings

Even if it is true that philosophy cannot be a cumulative or progressive knowledge (like physics, chemistry and biology); nevertheless, philosophical anthropology, especially in its phenomenological moment (but also in the transcendental one), can profit today as far as concerns the philosophical knowledge of man from some already definitively acquired results.[10]

A first important result regards the limit of any philosophical anthropology. It has to do with a being so fabulously rich and complex, that the result is practically indefinable: man is a being so vast, so varied, so multiform, that every definition demonstrates itself as too limited. Man aspect are too numerous.[11]

A second result can be acquired by reflecting on the many two-word definitions of man proposed by philosophers: “a rational animal” (Aristotle), “a fallen soul” (Plato), “an image of the logos” (Philo), “a mode of the substance” (Spinoza), “will of power” (Nietzsche), “ a fallen God” (Origen), etc.[12]

According to Battista Mondin, from the better part of these definitions it emerges that man is a kind of prodigy that combines within himself apparent antitheses: he is a fallen, or unrealizable, divinity; an unsuccessful absolute value, or empty of absolutization; an infinite or unreachable possibility. For this reason, Mondin thinks that it would not be wrong to define man as an “impossible possibility”…. It certainly cannot be said that man is a necessary possibility, this is a definition of God as proposed by Leibniz: he is simply a possible possibility inasmuch as is able to be realized in the arc of historical existence.[13]

But as a result of the definitions referred to above, we encounter in man something specifically his – a tension towards the infinite, a tension towards transhistoric existence, because of which we have ask ourselves if this tension is a possible or impossible possibility, a pure utopia or an eschatological reality. How are we to intend this absolute value that is the human being...? Does man present himself as a grandiose, colossal project? Or do we find ourselves opposite an impossible, lacking, failed project? This is the great question (the question of questions), which we are about to attempt from the works of Jean-Paul Satre, how he sees the activities of man, and how he understand man to be. From there, we shall go by way of evaluation so as to have a stand in this problem of the possibility-man. But in the exploration of human activity, we sure encounter valid clues that man is not a “vain passion”, as Satre stated, but a possible possibility.[14]

JEAN-PAUL SATRE AND MAN

Satre, trying to understand, and communicate this being; man to us, he followed different processes, this we shall come across as we look into his works or writ-ups. Before we proceed to the works of Satre, let us at this point, reiterate, that for satre, man is a free being, who is a possible possibility, for we this we shall come to understand, what he says in his write-up, concerning the existence, nature of man. At this point we shall go into the works of this great existentialist, to see how he answers or from what point he views man; the “complex of all complex being”, the “question of questions”.

Satre Human-Centered Ontology

Satre’s task, as evident from the subtide of his major work, is to develop a phenomenological ontology: phenomenology, as we know, is the study of the way the world is revealed through the structures of consciousness. Satre believes this will also provide us with ontology or an account of what the world must be like for experience to be the way it is. However, while ontology can describe the structure of being, it cannot answer metaphysical questions, such as why this particular world exists. Hence, Satre tries to provide descriptive answers to how? and what? questions from within the scope of human consciousness, but with Kant, he says it is meaningless to ask ‘why’ questions that refers beyond the limit of reality as we experience it. All we can say is that being is without reason, without cause, without necessity.[15]

Satre’s philosophy owes more to Heidegger than to any other thinker. However, there were differences between the two. For Satre, the standpoint of the human subject is the beginning and end of his philosophy. There is never any hint of Heidegger’s Being that calls to us through the poet and in terms of which we can find a “saving power.” On the contrary, for Satre human consciousness confronts a totality of being that is alien and meaningless. Satre’s writings return to the emphasis on human ruling and action. Going along with this is the kind of subjectivism Heidegger tried so hard to avoid. According to Satre, we must make our way in the world by subjectively creating meaning, rather than having it flood in on us by the letting-be of what-is as Heidegger proposed.[16]

The Contingency of Being

There is no necessity for the existence of being, says satre.

Necessity concerns the connection between ideal propositions but not that of existents. An existing phenomenon can never be derived from another existent qua existent[17].

All we can say about the existence of being is that it simply is. It is just there, without any reason for its being; its existence is not necessary, in fact it is superfluous. This is what we shall contingency of being. Satre goes on to identify the contingency of being with the absurdity of being and says that being is absurd, existence is absurd.

We spoke of absurdity, we might as well have said contingency. To exist, is simply to be there. The world of explanation and reason is not that of existence. I was beginning to understand that I had found the key to existence… to my life. I am superfluous…[18]

Satre rejects the traditional explanation of the contingency of being in terms of a Necessary Being who is responsible for the existence of the contingent beings. This Necessary Being, says Satre, was invented to overcome the contingency of being and the absurdity of existence. Some people who have discovered the absurdity of existence tried to overcome it by inventing a Necessary Being. But no necessary being can explain existence.[19] Satre rejects the idea of creation, which according to him is also invented to explain to the phenomenon of being.

A clear view of the phenomenon of being, satre says has often been obscured by a very common prejudice which we shall call ‘creationism’. Since people suppose that God had given being to the world, being always appeared tainted with a certain passivity. But a creation ex nihilo cannot explain the coming to pass of being[20]

Satre goes on to say that being ‘assumes its being beyond creation… this is equivalent to saying that being is uncreated.’[21] If being exists objectively then it is independent of creator, since it exists on its own and is its own support, and ‘it does not preserve the least trace of divine creation.’[22] To advance the theory of perpetual creation would not help, for such a theory makes being ‘disappear in subjectivity… and the creature is no way distinguished from its creator.’[23] Thus, neither the theory of a necessary being nor that of creation can explain the contingency and absurdity of existence.

Conscious and Unconscious Beings

Satre distinguishes between two kinds of being, namely, conscious being (etre-pour-soi) and unconscious being (etre-en-soi). He identifies the conscious being (being for-itself) with the human being, and with consciousness itself. He also identifies consciousness of being for-itself with ‘emptiness’, ‘negativity’ and ‘nothingness’.

In contrast to being for-itself (conscious being) is being in-itself (unconscious being). Unlike conscious being, which is pure negativity, unconscious being is pure positivity. It is planitude, compact density and full of itself. It does not have nothingness or negation within its being, nor can it posit itself other than it is; it is what it is, and fully identical with itself. It has no reason for its being, it is just there. It has no ‘within’ which is opposed to a ‘without’.

The Nature of Human Freedom

Philosophers have debated for centuries about whether or not we have freedom. However, Satre has the most radical and totalistic view of human freedom. He says we do not have freedom, we are freedom; freedom – I sought it far away; it was so near that I could not touch it, that I can’t touch it – it is in fact myself. I am my freedom.[24] Freedom is not one property among many, but is intrinsic to the sort of being we are, for at each moment of our existence we are creating ourselves anew. Most have assumed that having free will would be a welcome condition, but in one of his most striking comments, Satre says, “We are condemned to freedom” – whatever it does, freedom cannot escape its existence.[25] Freedom is not free not to be free… it is not free not to exist.[26] He wants to impress on us what an overwhelming burden it is that we cannot escape freedom. For as he puts it; “freedom is the freedom of choosing but not the freedom of not choosing. Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose.[27] He quotes Dostoevsky’s pronouncement “if God does not exist, everything would have been permitted.”[28] We want some directions in making decisions. We want to fall back on some objective realm of values that will assure us we are making the right choice, however, the fact is that; we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse[29]

From what we have highlighted thus far, one may conclude, that indeed Satre, is a great philosopher, to be noted. Still on what have so far treated, there are several works of his, which even if given a long essay, we still cannot exhaust. Therefore, at this juncture, one would like to give a summary of this great philosopher – Jean-Paul Satre who has brought to human consciousness the idea that we are responsible for whatever position we choose to take, since out of our freedom we choose to do what we do, whether consciously or unconsciously.


SARTRE JEAN-PAUL’S SUMMARY

1. EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE. "Freedom is existence, and in it existence precedes essence." This means that what we do, how we act in our life, determines our apparent "qualities." It is not that someone tells the truth because she is honest, but rather she defines herself as honest by telling the truth again and again.
I am a professor in a way different than the way I am six feet tall, or the way a table is a table. The table simply is; I exist by defining myself in the world at each moment.

2. SUBJECT RATHER THAN OBJECT. Humans are not objects to be used by God or a government or corporation or society. Nor we to be "adjusted" or molded into roles --to be only a waiter or a conductor or a mother or worker. We must look deeper than our roles and find ourselves.

3. FREEDOM is the central and unique potentiality which constitutes us as human. Sartre rejects determinism, saying that it is our choice how we respond to determining tendencies.

4. CHOICE. I am my choices. I cannot not choose. If I do not choose, that is still a choice. If faced with inevitable circumstances, we still choose how we are in those circumstances.

5. RESPONSIBILITY. Each of us is responsible for everything we do. If we seek advice from others, we choose our advisor and have some idea of the course he or she will recommend. "I am responsible for my very desire of fleeing responsibilities."

6. PAST DETERMINANTS SELDOM TELL US THE CRUCIAL INFORMATION. We transform past determining tendencies through our choices. Explanations in terms of family, socioeconomic status, etc., do not tell us why a person makes the crucial choices we are most interested in.

7. OUR ACTS DEFINE US. "In life, a man commits himself, draws his own portrait, and there is nothing but that portrait." Our illusions and imaginings about ourselves, about what we could have been, are nothing but self-deception.

8. WE CONTINUALLY MAKE OURSELVES AS WE ARE. A "brave" person is simply someone who usually acts bravely. Each act contributes to defining us as we are, and at any moment we can begin to act differently and draw a different portrait of ourselves. There is always a possibility to change, to start making a different kind of choice.

9. OUR POWER TO CREATE OURSELVES. We have the power of transforming ourselves indefinitely.

10. OUR REALITY AND OUR ENDS. Human reality "identifies and defines itself by the ends which it pursues", rather than by alleged "causes" in the past.

11. SUBJECTIVISM means the freedom of the individual subject, and that we cannot pass beyond subjectivity.

12. THE HUMAN CONDTION. Despite different roles and historical situations, we all have to be in the world, to labor and die there. These circumstances "are everywhere recognizable; and subjective because they are lived and are nothing if we do not live them.

13. CONDEMNED TO BE FREE. We are condemned because we did not create ourselves. We must choose and act from within whatever situation we find ourselves.

14. ABANDONMENT. "I am abandoned in the world... in the sense that I find myself suddenly alone and without help.

15. ANGUISH. "It is in anguish that we become conscious of our freedom. ...My being provokes anguish to the extent that I distrust myself and my own reactions in that situation."
1) We must make some choices knowing that the consequences will have profound effects on others (like a commander sending his troops into battle.)
2) In choosing for ourselves we choose for all humankind.

16. DESPAIR.
We limit ourselves to a reliance on that which is within our power, our capability to influence. There are other things very important to us over which we have no control.

17. BAD FAITH means to be guilty of regarding oneself not as a free person but as an object. In bad faith I am hiding the truth from myself. "I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully. (There seems to be some overlap in Sartre's conception of bad faith and his conception of self-deception.)
A person can live in bad faith which ...implies a constant and particular style of life.

18. "THE UNCONSCIOUS" IS NOT TRULY UNCONSCIOUS. At some level I am aware of, and I choose, what I will allow fully into my consciousness and what I will not. Thus I cannot use "the unconscious" as an excuse for my behavior. Even though I may not admit it to myself, I am aware and I am choosing.
Even in self-deception, I know I am the one deceiving myself, and Freud's so-called censor must be conscious to know what to repress.
Those who use "the unconscious" as exoneration of actions believe that our instincts, drives, and complexes make up a reality that simply is; that is neither true nor false in itself but simply real.

19. PASSION IS NO EXCUSE. "I was overwhelmed by strong feelings; I couldn't help myself" is a falsehood. Despite my feelings, I choose how to express them in action.

20. ONTOLOGY: the study of being, of what constitutes a person as a person, is the necessary basis for psychoanalysis.

CONCLUSION

From the above, we cannot but agree with Satre that man is a free being. But the question we must ask, is that, is it the case that man is entirely free? Or is it the case that at some point, man’s freedom takes hold of man? For if man is entirely free, then what have we to say, as to the idea of the laws of nature, for even though Satre tries to disagree that man is subjected to the law of nature, he himself, will also know that by nature, he is. And this will lead us to a second question, which is with regards to the creation of man; that is the coming to being of man. Satre tries to negate the fact that man is a created being. Then the question is how then did man come about? This question of course, will lead us to another problem, as to the beingness of man.

Nevertheless, Satre in his work has helped us realize, that what so ever position we take, whether to choose or not to choose, is our freedom. He has brought to our consciousness that man is not a being that has freedom, but a free being, meaning that man itself is freedom. And as such, man should not desire what he already has, therefore, Satre places everybody, whether god or man in the same pedestal. But can this be the case, of man having an absolute freedom?

References

· Dr Edema; lecture note; Philosophical Anthropology; 2009/2010 session

· Battista Mondin; philosophical Anthropology; published by Theological Publications In India, St Peter’s Pontifical Seminary, Malleswaram West, Urbaniana Univesity Press, Rome 1985.

· William F. Lawhead; Voyage of Discovery

· Jean-Paul Satre; Le suris, paris; Gallimard, 1945.

· Jean-Paul Satre; Existentialism is a Humanism; trans. Philip Mairet, in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Satre. Ed. Walter Kaufmann; New York: Meridian books. 1956.

· Hazel Banes, trans. Being and Nothingness; New York Washington square press 1956.

· Jean-Paul Satre; La Naus; Paris: Gallimard, 1938

· Encyclopedia Britanica; Ultimate reference suit.

· www.wikipedia.com

· www.stanfordencyclopedia.com

· www.googlesearch.com



[1] Dr. Edema; lecture note on Philosophical Anthropology; 2009/2010 session

[2] Ibid

[3] ibid

[4] Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate reference suit; 2009.

[5] ibid

[7] ibid

[8] ibid

[9] Biography of Jean-Paul Satre; www.stanfordencyclopedia.com

[10] Battista Mondin; Philosophical Anthropology p. 19

[11] Ibid

[12] Ibid p. 20

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid p. 21

[15] The Voyage of Discovery; phenomenology and existentialism

[16] Ibid p.547

[17] Jean-Paul Satre, Being and Nothingness, cit. p. 39

[18] Jean-Paul Satre, La Naus,

[19] Ibid p. 185

[20]Satre, Being and Nothingness

[21] Ibid p. 11

[22] Ibid p. 34

[23] Ibid p. 34

[24] Jean-Paul Satre, Le Sursis.

[25] Satre, Being and Nothingness

[26] Ibid p. 486

[27] Ibid p. 481

[28] Existentialism is a Humanism; Satre

[29]Ibid 297